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WASHINGTON’S WATER RIGHT IMPAIRMENT 
STANDARD: HOW THE CURRENT INTERPRETATION 




“[T]he knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never 
exists in concentrated or integrated form, but solely as the dispersed bits of 




ABSTRACT: Washington manages water rights under conflicting goals—
maximizing net benefits while protecting water rights from any impairment. 
Over time, the state judiciary, often at the request of the Washington 
Department of Ecology (Ecology), has elevated the water right impairment 
standard to an absolute protection. Initially, Division III of the Washington 
Court of Appeals held that it was proper for Ecology to require a modeled impact 
of 0.004 percent in river flows, finding that this was substantial and could not be 
allowed;2 then, the Washington Supreme Court concluded that any impact 
constituted impairment;3 and most recently, the Court paradoxically declared 
that instream flows are too valuable to be submitted to a balancing test where 
their value would be less than other uses.4 
The result is an absolutist application of the impairment standard that 
impedes the consideration of net benefits in new use or change authorizations. 
This strict legal interpretation occurs in contrast to the stated legislative 
purpose and in spite of recent legislative programs that have sought to ease the 
impairment requirements. In practice, this tension is acknowledged and some 
impairment is allowed. 
This Comment outlines the impairment standard as applied, and reads 
recent legislative modifications to the water code as creating an agreed upon 
loosening of the standard. Further, the Comment argues that the current 
standard impedes the ability of market and regulatory forces to facilitate 
changes and transfers that maximize the net benefits of water use. This 
Comment suggests that Washington’s water policy of obtaining the maximum 
net benefits would be better served by an impairment standard that allows for 
1. F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 519 (1945). 
2. Hubbard v. Wash. Dep’t. of Ecology, 86 Wash. App. 119, 126, 936 P.2d 27, 30 
(1997). 
3. Postema v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 142 Wash. 2d 68, 95, 11 P.3d 726, 742 
(2000). 
4. Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 178 Wash. 2d 571 n.15, 
311 P.3d 6, 20 (2013). 
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some level of impairment of instream and out-of-stream existing uses, and 
suggests increasing the ability of Ecology to regulate existing rights. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Washington is experiencing a growing population, depressed 
fisheries, development of new industries, changing agricultural 
markets, the impacts of climate change, and increasing legal 
and financial support for instream flows.5 Presciently, 
Washington’s water policy seeks to “obtain the maximum net 
benefits” of water resources and puts in place tools to re-
allocate water to that end.6 This goal of “net” benefits 
implicitly recognizes competing uses and an optimization that 
impacts other uses.7 Unfortunately, the current impairment 
framework leads to an underutilization of the resource.8 This 
occurs by restricting the ability of the State’s administrative 
agency in charge of water rights, the Department of Ecology, to 
regulate existing water rights while increasing the cost of 
market re-allocation resulting in maintenance of the status 
quo, not a process that facilitates the maximization of net 
benefits.9 
5. WASH. DEPT OF ECOLOGY, 2010 Report to the Legislature and Governor: Water 
Resources Program Functions and Funding Structure, at 2–4, 10-11-022 (2010). This 
paper uses the term instream flows to refer to both minimum instream flows set by 
statute and water rights issued for instream use. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.22.010 (2012); 
see also § 90.42.040. 
6. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.005 (2012). 
7. Id. 
8. See infra Part II. 
9. See infra Part IV. 
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The desire to maximize net benefits of water use is 
recognized throughout Washington’s water code. The Revised 
Code of Washington (RCW) 90.03.005 states, “It is the policy of 
the state to promote the use of the public waters in a fashion 
which provides for obtaining maximum net benefits arising 
from both diversionary uses. . .[while retaining water to 
protect] instream and natural values and rights.”10 RCW 
90.54.020(2) states that “allocation of water should be based 
generally on securing the maximum net benefits for the people 
of the state.”11 
The Legislature recognized that this involves a tension in 
allocating the resource. RCW 90.42.005(1)(a) includes a 
legislative finding that “Washington is faced with a shortage of 
water with which to meet existing and future needs.”12 RCW 
90.42.005(1)(b) contains a legislative finding listing acceptable 
methods for “reliev[ing] current critical water situations, 
provid[ing] for presently unmet needs, and assist[ing] in 
meeting future water needs.”13 
This Comment reviews the existing judicial framework 
regarding impairment determinations and concludes that it 
does not support the State’s water policy of obtaining the 
maximum net benefit from use of public waters. It then 
proceeds to review exceptions, or alternatives, to the judicial 
impairment framework and discusses how those efforts 
maximize net benefits, and concludes by recommending that 
the judicial framework be relaxed to encourage and facilitate 
voluntary water transfers in order to maximize net benefits.14 
II. WASHINGTON’S IMPAIRMENT FRAMEWORK IS 
OBTRUSIVE 
Washington’s impairment framework protects the status 
quo—not the water policy of maximizing the net benefits or 
water resources or the rights of existing users.15 This occurs 
because (A) a series of judicial rulings deferred to Ecology’s 
10. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.005 (2012). 
11. Id. § 90.54.020(2). 
12. Id. § 90.42.005(1)(a). 
13. Id. § 90.42.005(1)(b). 
14. This Comment presumes without further discussion that “Maximizing net 
benefits” refers to all benefits (economic, social, and environmental). 
15. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.03.005 (2012), see also § 90.54.020(2). 
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definition of impairment, and (B) these rulings have been 
shown to create an obtrusive framework.16 
A. The Judiciary Expanded, In The Name of Administrative 
Deference, What Qualifies As Impairment 
Impairment is a malleable term of art. In Washington, the 
outcome has been a rigid interpretation intended to protect 
senior water rights. This has taken the form of holdings that 
find impairment is substantial when a model predicts impact 
of 0.004 percent in river flows,17 or has any impact.18 In a 
literal sense, this is consistent with the fundamental principles 
of prior appropriation that first in time is first in right.19 Also, 
legally, something is impaired when you diminish its value.20 
However, this absolutism is contrary to the state’s water 
policy, and is not a normative part of American thought and 
property law, as rights are not usually seen as absolutes.21 Nor 
was it considered as such before the codification of prior 
appropriation schemes.22 Further, in the context of a public 
16. See generally Stephen N. Bretsen & Peter J. Hill, Water Markets As A Tragedy of 
the Anticommons, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 723 (2009) (describing how 
unbundling of property rights can increase transaction costs and lead to economic 
inefficiencies); Andrew P. Morriss, Lessons from the Development of Western Water 
Law for Emerging Water Markets: Common Law vs. Central Planning, 80 OR. L. REV. 
861, 938-40 (2001) (discussing negative impacts of central planning as opposed to 
common law and resulting impacts on prior appropriation). 
17. Hubbard v. Wash. Dep’t. of Ecology, 86 Wash. App. 119, 126, 936 P.2d 27, 30 
(1997). 
18. Postema v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 142 Wash. 2d 68, 95, 11 P.3d 726, 
742 (2000). 
19. See Neubert v. Yakima-Tieton Irrigation Dist., 117 Wash. 2d 232, 240, 814 P.2d 
199 (1991) (quoting Longmire v. Smith, 26 Wash. 439, 447, 67 P. 246 (1901)) (“[T]he 
first appropriator is entitled to the quantity of water appropriated by him, to the 
exclusion of subsequent claimants.”), WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.010 (2012) (“[A]s 
between appropriations, the first in time shall be the first in right.”), The principle 
that an appropriated water right is also perpetual and operates to the exclusion of all 
subsequent claims. Neubert v. Yakima-Tieton Irrigation Dist., 117 Wash. 2d 232, 240-
41, 814 P.2d 199 (1991). 
20. Black’s Law Dictionary 819 (9th ed. 2009). 
21. See e.g. Eric T. Freyfogle, On Private Property: Finding Common Ground on the 
Ownership of Land 6–9, 20–24 (2007) (discussing the “partial truths” that pervade 
American thought and property law, such as the right of landowners to exclude all 
others, the protection of liberty through the protection of property rights, and the 
absolute nature of private property rights). 
22. See Morriss, supra note 16, at 867 (describing prior common law approach as 
“flexible, decentralized and open”). 
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resource like water, where water right holders only have a 
usufructory right, it makes even less sense.23 Two cases outline 
the descent into this absolutist position. 
First, Division III of the Court of Appeals in Hubbard v. 
Department of Ecology declared that it was reasonable for 
Ecology to condition a right with de minimis impacts.24 Second, 
the Washington Supreme Court in Postema v. Pollution 
Control Hearings Board cemented the idea that any impact on 
an existing right constitutes impairment regardless of size.25 
1. Hubbard Articulated a Restrictive Interpretation of 
Impairment 
In Hubbard the Washington State Court of Appeals Division 
III addressed the idea of impairment in the context of 
hydraulic continuity.26 The case involved two appellants: the 
first had established an orchard relying upon a temporary 
permit and the assurance that he would probably receive a 
permit in a year, and the second had a permit but needed 
additional water for irrigation and frost protection.27 During 
its examination, Ecology determined that the wells in question 
exhibited “significant hydraulic continuity” with surface flows 
and that their use would be conditioned on the maintenance of 
instream flows pursuant to Washington Administrative Code 
(WAC) 173–549–060.28 On appeal, the issue was whether 
Ecology had shown that significant continuity between the 
wells and the surface flows existed.29 
Appellants argued that their permit should not be 
conditioned because impacts were not “significant.”30 They 
retained an expert who modeled that their permits would only 
have a 0.004 percent reduction in the river’s flow, and, as such, 
23. Christine O. Gregoire, James K. Pharris & P. Thomas McDonald, An 
Introduction to Washington Water Law 1:2 (2000) (discussing usufructory nature of 
water rights). 
24. Hubbard v. Wash. Dep’t. of Ecology, 86 Wash. App. 119, 936 P.2d 27 (1997). 
25. Postema v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 142 Wash. 2d 68, 11 P.3d 726 (2000). 
26. Hubbard, 86 Wash. App. 119, 122, 936 P.2d 27, 28 (1997). Hydraulic connectivity 
goes to the connection between surface water groundwater sources. WASH. ADMIN. 
CODE § 173-549-060 (2012). 
27. Hubbard, 86 Wash. App. 119, 122, 936 P.2d 27, 28 (1997). 
28. Id. at 122, 936 P.2d at 28. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
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was “so minuscule that it cannot be considered important or of 
consequence.”31 The Court disagreed. They read the rule to 
require that Ecology either reject or condition applications that 
will have any effect on instream flows.32 The significance of the 
impacts was not a part of the Court’s test.33 The Court 
concluded by saying they would not set aside Ecology’s decision 
absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion and that the 
record before the administrative appeals board, the Pollution 
Control Hearings Board, below did not demonstrate that it was 
manifestly unreasonable for Ecology to condition the permit.34 
Hubbard is significant for its affirmation that groundwater 
permits could be conditioned on surface-water rights. Also, by 
relying solely on the dictionary definition of “significant” and 
failing to consider the state’s maximum net use policy, it made 
changes and transfers more difficult to implement.35 The case 
does not, however, stand for the proposition that Ecology must 
condition any right if any amount impairment will result. The 
opinion used extremely deferential language with regards to 
Ecology’s decision-making authority to reach this conclusion. 
When this issue reached the Washington Supreme Court in 
Postema that flexibility was lost.36 
2. Postema v. Pollution Control Hearings Board Adopted a 
Restrictive Interpretation of Impairment 
In Postema, the Washington Supreme Court directly 
addressed how hydraulic continuity plays into impairment and 
removed any uncertainty that remained following Hubbard.37 
Postema involved five consolidated cases in which applications 
for groundwater appropriation permits were denied because 
the groundwater sources were in hydraulic continuity with 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 125-26, 936 P.2d at 30. 
33. Id. at 126-27, 936 P.2d at 30. 
34. Id. at 127, 936 P.2d at 30. 
35. See Jeffrie Minier, Conjunctive Management of Stream-Aquifer Water Rights; the 
Hubbard Decision, 38 NAT. RESOURCES J. 651, 658 (1998) (describing pragmatic 
impacts of Hubbard); Melissa Ure, Conjunctive Management and A Sustainable 
Future, 14 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L.J. 132, 146 (2011) (recognizing deleterious impacts of 
Hubbard on conjunctive management). 
36. Postema v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 142 Wash. 2d 68, 11 P.3d 726 (2000). 
37. Id. 
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surface water sources that had minimum flow rules.38 As such, 
the permits could not be issued under the four-part test for 
water availability which the court summarized as: “Ecology 
must affirmatively find (1) that water is available, (2) for a 
beneficial use, and that (3) an appropriation will not impair 
existing rights, or (4) be detrimental to the public welfare.”39 
The Court’s analysis turned on two prongs: what impacts were 
allowable (to the minimum flows) and what constituted an 
impact. 
The Court rejected appellants’ claims that a direct and 
measurable impact on surface water must be shown using 
standard stream measuring devices before the applications 
could be denied, or that a significant measurable effect on 
stream flows was required before denying the permits.40 
Interestingly, the Court also rejected the idea that the simple 
fact that minimum flows are unmet for a substantial part of 
the year equates to impairment of existing rights as a matter 
of law.41 Instead, the Court held that a denial is only required 
“where there is hydraulic continuity and withdrawal of 
groundwater would impair existing surface water rights, 
including minimum flow rights.”42 Finally, the Court said that 
a showing of hydraulic continuity between an aquifer and a 
stream having unmet minimum flows is not, in and of itself, a 
basis for denial of a groundwater application.43 
The Court went on to clarify that the determination of 
hydraulic continuity is merely a factual test and not something 
that resolves any part of the four-part test.44 However, if it is 
factually established “that the withdrawal will have any effect 
on the flow or level of the surface water” it must be denied.45 
This is because “[h]ydraulic continuity is not the legal 
standard, no impairment is.”46 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 79, 11 P.3d at 734. 
40. Id. at 92-93, 11 P.3d at 741. 
41. Id. at 93, 11 P.3d at 741. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 94, 11 P.3d at 741–42. 
45. Id. at 95, 11 P.3d at 742. 
46. Id. at 97, 11 P.3d at 743 (internal quotations omitted). 
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This holding brought to a head the concept of what 
constitutes impairment. Justice Sanders’ dissent in Postema 
stated that “[b]y disallowing even an immeasurable effect on 
minimum flows, the majority approach injects irrationality 
into the equation, requiring greater specificity than the 
standard itself.”47 He further quoted the definitions of “de 
minimis” and “impair,” making the case that Ecology has a 
duty under RCW 90.03.290 and RCW 90.54.020(2) to allow 
beneficial projects when they have no discernible impacts.48 
Justice Sanders would have imposed a requirement that 
applications be denied “only if it is established factually [that] 
the withdrawal will have an appreciable and material adverse 
effect on the minimum flows necessary to provide for 
preservation of wildlife, fish, scenic, aesthetic, other 
environmental values, or navigation.”49 In contrast to Justice 
Sander’s proposed standard, Postema cements Washington’s 
absolutist judicial framing of impairment. While impairment 
must be shown, any effect will do; the magnitude does not 
matter. 
B. Recent Developments in the Kittitas and Swinomish 
Basins Demonstrate the Obtrusiveness of this Framework 
Ecology operates and has issued guidance in an attempt to 
comply with this judicial framework.50 Ecology guidance 
defines impairment as: 
‘Impair’ or ‘impairment’ means 1) to adversely impact 
the physical availability of water for a beneficial use 
that is entitled to protection, including earlier filed 
applications, and/or 2) to prevent the beneficial use of 
the water to which one is entitled, and/or 3) to 
adversely affect the flow of a surface water course at a 
time when the flows are at or below instream flows 
levels established by rule.51 
47. Id. at 131, 11 P.3d at 760 (Sanders, J., dissenting). 
48. Id. at 127–31, 11 P.3d at 758–60 (Sanders, J., dissenting). 
49. Id. at 132, 11 P.3d at 761 (Sanders, J., dissenting). 
50. See, e.g. WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, POL-1200, POLICY FOR THE EVALUATION OF 
CHANGES OR TRANSFERS TO WATER RIGHTS (1999) [hereinafter TRANSFER POLICY]; 
WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, POL-1017, POLICY REGARDING COLLECTION OF RAINWATER 
FOR BENEFICIAL USE (2009). 
51. TRANSFER POLICY, supra note 50. 
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Ecology’s definition is consistent with Postema and it serves 
to highlight the burden put on Ecology to determine if 
impairment will occur. Pursuant to this policy, Ecology will 
conduct a “tentative determination of extent and validity” of an 
existing right, chopping off any element of the right that 
cannot be substantiated.52 This is a stark contrast to Oregon 
where a perfected and developed right is not subject to partial 
relinquishment so long as it has the necessary “pumps and 
pipes” needed to use the entire water right.53 Applying 
principles of administrative deference,54 recent developments 
demonstrate an eroded ability to encourage the maximization 
of net benefits. 
1. Exempt Wells Have Come Under Heightened Scrutiny in 
the Kittitas Basin Disproportionate to their Impact 
Between 2007 and 2010 Ecology issued nine emergency 
rules on the regulation of exempt wells in the Kittitas Basin.55 
(By statute an “exempt well” provides exemptions from 
permitting requirements for certain uses, including domestic 
use not exceeding five thousand gallons a day.)56 A final rule 
was adopted in December of 2010 after a long and intricate 
process.57 One outcome of this rule-making was Kittitas County 
v. Eastern Washington Growth Management Hearings Board 
where the Washington Supreme Court held that “[a] County is 
not precluded and, in fact, is required to plan for the protection 
52. Id. 
53. OR. REV. STAT. §540.610(3) (2005) (right not subject to forfeiture if “(a) The user 
has a facility capable of handling the entire rate and duty authorized under the right; 
and (b) The user is otherwise ready, willing and able to make full use of the right”). 
54. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology v. Theodoratus, 135 Wash. 2d 582, 589, 957 P.2d 1241, 
1244 (1998); Port of Seattle v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 151 Wash. 2d 568, 587, 
90 P.3d 659, 669 (2004)(applying agency deference to complex litigation arising from 
airport runway construction with water resource elements). 
55. See WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, Upper Kittitas Ground Water Rule, 173-539A 
WAC (Archive), http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/wr/cro/kittitas_wp_rulebg.html (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2014). The Groundwater Code contains an exemption allowing an 
appropriator to use a limited amount of water for certain uses. WASH. REV. CODE § 
90.44.050. See also Jeremy Lieb, Comment, A Solution to the Exempt Well Problem? 
The New Role of Counties in Determining Legal Water Availability in Washington 
State, 3 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 60 (2013). 
56. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.050. 
57. WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, Upper Kittitas Ground Water Rule, 173-539A WAC 
(Archive), available at http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/wr/cro/kittitas_wp_rulebg.html 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2014). 
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of water resources in its land use planning.”58 Ultimately, this 
has resulted in all new water uses in the Kittitas having to 
either acquire mitigation or transfer an existing water right. 
A process was established to allow new uses to either 
acquire mitigation or transfer an existing water right.59 
Because of peculiarities specific to the Yakima Basin, new uses 
are allowed through a determination of “water-budget 
neutrality” by Ecology.60 Several mitigation exchanges have 
been established, with assistance from Ecology, to meet 
demand.61 This process is expensive; The Sequim Gazette in 
2012 reported prices of $7500-$12,500 per “equivalent 
residential unit.”62 
This approach is a gold standard for protecting existing 
rights. As of mid-2013, a typical determination was sought for 
approximately 0.414 acre-feet (0.392 acre-feet indoor and 0.022 
outdoor) with mitigation of 0.137 acre-feet (0.118 acre-feet 
indoor and 0.019 outdoor).63 In gallons, this represents an 
average use of 370 gallons per day of which only 122 gallons 
per day requires mitigation during the irrigation season or 
storage capacity to retain for later release during the non-
irrigation season. For perspective, the reservoirs in the 
Yakima basin have a total active capacity of 1,065,400 acre-
feet, and the total annual water demand in the basin is 
2,950,000 acre-feet providing water for approximately 500,000 
58. Kittitas County v. E. Washington Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 172 Wash. 2d 
144, 179, 256 P.3d 1193, 1210 (2011) (holding that jurisdictions planning under the 
Growth Management Act (WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.040) had to protect groundwater 
from detrimental land uses (i.e. permit exempt wells)). 
59. WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, Frequently Asked Questions: Upper Kittitas Ground 
Water Rule 10-11-021, (April 17, 2014) available at 
https://fortress.wa.gov/ecy/publications/summarypages/1011021.html. 
60. Id. 
61. WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, Yakima River Basin Water Exchanges, available at 
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/wr/cro/wtrxchng.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2014) (“A 
‘Water Exchange’ is a tool for providing the mechanism to make water available 
through mitigation”). 
62. Mark St. J. Couhig, Water Rule Slows Development in Kittitas, SEQUIM GAZETTE, 
(Jul. 11, 2012), http://www.sequimgazette.com/news/article.exm/2012-07-
11_water_rule_slows_development_in_kittitas. 
63. See WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, Water Budget Neutral (WBN) Determination 
Archive for Upper Kittitas County, available at 
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/wr/cro/kittitas_wbn_archive.html (last visited Mar. 
10, 2014) (listing prior WBN determinations). 
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irrigated acres.64 Each new use represents approximately one-
billionth of a percent (0.0000001%) of water demand. 
This process does not directly address the State’s policy of 
“seeking net benefits.”65 It does prove that an administrative 
process can be created to provide mitigation for exempt wells. 
However, given that some of these exempt wells provide water 
for basic human needs,66 and that other programs have been 
able to place water in Trust for one-hundredth of the cost,67 
requiring full-scale mitigation of exempt wells raises serious 
questions about its net benefit to the State. This is especially 
true in light of other out-of-kind mitigation that could be 
utilized, potentially at a cheaper cost.68 
2. In Swinomish the Washington Supreme Court Rejected 
Ecology’s Use of the Overriding Consideration of the Public 
Interest Exception for Exempt Wells 
In Swinomish, the Washington Supreme Court further 
reduced Ecology discretion by limiting the use of the 
Overriding Consideration of the Public Interest (OCPI) test 
found in RCW 90.54.69 The case invalidated an instream flow 
rule in the Skagit River and its tributaries.70 The minimum 
flow rule provides that at least 10,000 cubic feet per second 
(cfs) of flow must be maintained in the main stem of the Skagit 
River, effectively precluding new water uses in the late 
summer and early fall when low flows generally drop below the 
64. M. C. Mastin and J. J. Vaccaro, Watershed Models for Decision Supporting the 
Yakima River Basin, Washington, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, 5 Open-File Report 02-
404 (2002). 
65. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.005, see also § 90.54.020(2). 
66. Dena Marshall and Janet Neuman, Seeking A Shared Understanding of the 
Human Right to Water: Collaborative Use Agreements in the Umatilla and Walla 
Walla Basins of the Pacific Northwest, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 361 (2011). 
67. Washington State Conservation Commission, Irrigation Efficiencies Grants 
Program: 2008 Report, available at: http://www.scc.wa.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/2008_iegp_annual_report.pdf ($829 per acre-feet, or $114 for 
0.137 acre-feet). This figure does not include all transactions costs as this water is not 
used for mitigation of new uses. 
68. Mitigating for impacts on instream flows with riparian enhancements or 
placement of woody debris for example. 
69. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.54.020. 
70. Instream Resources Protection Program—Lower And Upper Skagit Water 
Resources Inventory Area (WRIA 3 And 4) WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 173-503 (2013). 
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prescribed level.71 Historically average flows in the Skagit 
River Basin have been 16,560 cfs with low flows of 5970 cfs.72 
In 2006, the Rule was amended to establish finite 
“reservations” of surface and groundwater for future out-of-
stream uses.73 The reservations provided uninterruptible 
(year-round) water supplies for new agricultural, residential, 
commercial/industrial, and livestock uses, distributed among 
twenty-five subbasins.74 The reservation was for twenty-five 
cfs of which 23.79 cfs came from the main stem Skagit River, 
less than 0.004 percent of flows during low flow conditions.75 
The reservations were created by relying on OCPI.76 
Ecology utilized a three-step test to authorize the use of 
OCPI: (1) to what extent important public interests would be 
served by the proposed reservations; (2) to what extent the 
proposed reservations would harm any public interests; and (3) 
whether the interests in step (1) clearly overrode any harm 
from step (2).77 They concluded that it did because at step one 
important public interests would be advanced, impacts to 
aquatic resources and recreation would be small, and, at step 
two, the benefits of the reservation clearly overrode the small 
potential harm.78 
a. Swinomish’s Tautological OCPI Analysis 
The Court found that the amended rule was “inconsistent 
with the plain language of the statute and. . .inconsistent with 
71. WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§§ 173-503-040 (2013); see also Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 
Skagit River Basin — Water Management Rule, 
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/wr/instream-flows/skagitbasin.html (last visited May 
28, 2013). 
72. Brief for Respondent at 9, Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty. v. Wash. Dep’t of 
Ecology, 178 Wash. 2d. 571 (Case 87672-0). 
73. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, Skagit River Basin — Water Management Rule, 
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/wr/instream-flows/skagitbasin.html (last visited May 
28, 2013). 
74. Id. 
75. Brief for Respondent at 9, Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty. v. Wash. Dep’t of 
Ecology, 178 Wash. 2d. 571 (Case 87672-0). 
76. Id. at 18. 
77. Id. at 10. 
78. Id. at 10–12. 
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the entire statutory scheme.”79 The Court made the following 
four points. 
First, the Court held that instead of properly construing the 
OCPI exception as a narrow exception as required by Postema, 
Ecology improperly used the OCPI exception “as a broad grant 
of authority to reallocate water committed to existing 
minimum flow water rights when an appropriation could not 
[otherwise] be granted.”80 
Second, the Court held that Ecology’s balancing test 
provided undue weight to economic interests inconsistent with 
the requirement that “‘rivers and streams. . .shall be retained 
with base flows’ and withdrawals that would conflict with base 
flows are allowed only when ‘it is clear that overriding 
considerations of the public interest will be served.’” 81 In 
addressing the maximum net benefit criteria under RCW 
90.54.020, the Court held that it was not solely based on 
economic benefits and that the many of the benefits of 
instream uses cannot be quantified.82 The Court did not clarify 
why Ecology was unable to balance these costs.83 Rather, the 
Court stated that OCPI was inapplicable, and this situation 
could only be remedied by legislative action.84 The Court 
dismissed Ecology’s argument that “allowing limited quantities 
of water for some modicum of rural development is more than 
just a matter of economics,” and that the agency had 
“considered the benefits of allowing some limited growth in 
rural Skagit and Snohomish Counties in accordance with local 
land use plans and regulations, so that citizens who prefer a 
rural lifestyle can choose to live and work there.”85 
Third, the Court found the aggregation of future uses to be 
“contrary to the basic principle of the prior appropriation 
doctrine that first in time is the first in right,” greatly 
narrowing the potential scope of future reservations under the 
79. Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 178 Wash. 2d 571, 
602, 311 P.3d 6, 21 (2013). 
80. Id. at 589–90, 311 P.3d 6 at 15. 
81. Id. at 586–87, 311 P.3d 6 at 13 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 90.54.020(3)(a)). 
82. Id. at 600–01, 311 P.3d at 20. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 601, 311 P.3d at 20. 
85. Brief for Respondent at 33, Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty. v. Wash. Dep’t of 
Ecology, 178 Wash. 2d. 571 (Case 87672-0). 
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OCPI exception by effectively foreclosing the aggregation of 
water uses.86 
Fourth, the Court also rejected what it viewed as Ecology’s 
conflation of “beneficial use” with the “public interest.”87 The 
court held that “beneficial uses may be uses that public 
benefits only in the sense that any useful end to which water is 
put benefits the public,” and called out exempt wells as an 
example of “a private use, generally speaking, not a public 
use.”88 Under the Court’s logic, it is unclear what private uses 
are in the public interest if the provision of water for domestic 
supply does not qualify.89 It is also unclear why Ecology cannot 
incorporate the value of “being in the presence of crystal clear 
water coursing down a steep slope through a rock-lined, moss-
edged stream bed among evergreen trees” into an OCPI 
analysis.90 
b. The Swinomish Dissent Outlines Why the Majority’s OCPI 
Analysis is Obtrusive 
The partial dissent in Swinomish chastised the majority’s 
reasoning for being tautological in that it never addresses 
when the OCPI exception might apply.91 Specifically, the 
dissent asserts that the legislative history indicated OCPI was 
appropriate for rural and exempt well users.92 
The dissent argued that one of the exemptions, the 1.5 cfs 
reserved for exempt well users and rural public water systems, 
“would avoid significant costs on behalf of these underserved 
communities and would have little if any impact on 
environmental and aesthetic interests,” with the net benefit 
unequivocally comporting with the plain reading of the term 
“overriding.”93 The dissent would further have remanded to 
86. Swinomish, 178 Wash. 2d at 585-86, 311 P.3d at 15. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 587, 311 P.3d at 13. 
89. See Marshall & Neuman, supra note 66. 
90. Swinomish, 178 Wash. 2d at 600 note 15, 311 P.3d at 20. 
91. Id. at 603, 311 P.3d at 21 (Wiggins, J., dissenting in part). 
92. Id. at 603–06, 311 P.3d at 22–23 (also noting that “There is no evidence that the 
legislature intended the water statutes to work as a one-way ratchet, and such an 
interpretation flies in the face of the legislature’s clearly expressed intent to treat 
minimum flows and other beneficial uses equally.”). 
93. Id. 
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give Ecology a chance to assess the 1.5 cfs reservation for 
exempt well users and rural public water supplies as an 
independent exercise of the OCPI exemption.94 
The dissent also calls out the error in the majority’s logic 
that has its roots in Postema. “[T]he fact that minimum flows 
constitute vested appropriations of water does not make them 
immutable.”95 Under the majority’s logic, “Ecology’s statutory 
authority to modify minimum flows is really only statutory 
authority to increase the minimum,” and “[t]here is no 
evidence that the legislature intended the water statutes to 
work as a one-way ratchet,. . .the legislature[] clearly 
expressed intent to treat minimum flows and other beneficial 
uses equally.”96 
It is unfortunate that the exempt well issue was not 
remanded in Swinomish. OCPI is one of the best tools Ecology 
has available to “maximize” benefits in a way that explicitly 
allows impacts to existing rights.97 The Court invalidated 
Ecology’s use of OCPI to consider the out-of-stream use of 0.04 
percent of a stream with a low flow of 5970 cfs without 
providing clarity on where OCPI is appropriate.98 Even the 
most compelling component of the reservation, provision of 
water for domestic use, was paradoxically rejected as a private, 
not a public, use.99 Swinomish is an affirmation that instream 
rights must be taken seriously, but more importantly, it 
continues to elevate the impairment principle into an absolute 
entitlement that inhibits Ecology’s ability to administer the 
water code, discouraging transfers that facilitate the allocation 
of water to meet demand. 
94. Id. at 610, 311 P.3d at 25. 
95. Id. at 605, 311 P.3d at 22 (2013) (citing Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Pend Oreille Cty. 
v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 146 Wash. 2d 778, 81718, 51 P.3d 744 (2002) (finding that 
Ecology may impinge on extant water rights in the course of setting minimum flows)). 
96. Id. at 606, 311 P.3d at 22–23. 
97. Another unused option is that water rights may be condemned. WASH. REV. 
CODE § 90.03.290(4) (2012) (by court proceeding to determine greatest public benefit). 
98. Swinomish, 178 Wash.2d at 571, 311 P.3d at 6. 
99. Id. at 586, 311 P.3d at 13 (exempting well component). 
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III. THE LEGISLATURE AND THE DEPARTMENT OF 
ECOLOGY HAVE IMPLICITLY REJECTED THE 
JUDICIAL IMPAIRMENT FRAMEWORK 
The Judiciary, sometimes at the request of Ecology, has 
constructed a black and white definition of impairment that 
limits market reallocation. However, in some programs 
Ecology has utilized discretion based on long-standing and/or 
new statutory authority from the Legislature to operate 
programs with a less exacting interpretation of impairment. 
A. Ecology Exempts Rain Barrels from Requiring a Water 
Right 
One example of Ecology’s exercise in discretion is their Rain 
Barrel Policy.100 This interpretative policy states that rain 
barrels and guzzlers do not require a water right.101 Under the 
policy, Ecology only regulates rain barrels when there will be a 
“cumulative impact” that is “likely to negatively affect 
instream values or existing water rights.”102 Technically, 
Postema declined to address cumulative impacts.103 Postema, 
however, clearly held “that [if] the withdrawal will have any 
effect on the flow or level of the surface water[,]” it must be 
denied.104 Postema did not imply an exemption for uses that 
are in vogue within the environmental movement. Rain barrels 
in areas where instream flows are not met would fail the four-
part test,105 which does depend on the magnitude of impact.106 
Ecology’s rain barrel policy may represent good public policy 
choices, but unless there is a revival of deference to Ecology in 
interpreting the water code; the policy’s ability to withstand a 
legal challenge is questionable. Courts have been careful to 
differentiate a showing of continuity from impairment, but 
100. WATER RESOURCES PROGRAM, WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, POL-1017, POLICY 
REGARDING COLLECTION OF RAINWATER FOR BENEFICIAL USE (effective 10/9/09). 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Postema v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 142 Wash. 2d 68, 98-100, 11 P.3d 
726, 744-45 (2000) (emphasis added) 
104. Id. at 95, 11 P.3d at 742. 
105. See supra Part II.B.2. 
106. See supra Part II.A. See also Kittitas County v. E. Wash. Growth Mgmt. 
Hearings Bd., 172 Wash. 2d 144, 178, 256 P.3d 1193, 1209 (2011) (exempt wells). 
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that has largely involved cases of groundwater rights and 
instream flows.107 The connection between rain and a nearby 
stream or aquifer is clear. Therefore, the rain barrel exception 
is in conflict with the principles identified in Postema. 
B. Ecology Has Used RCW 90.54 to Allow Projects That Have 
Public and Private Benefits 
RCW 90.54 authorizes Ecology to consider the OCPI when 
making water right decisions.108 This capacity is of the utmost 
importance in basins where water is either physically 
unavailable or legally unavailable.109 In this situation, OCPI 
functions as a legislatively provided relief valve to ensure 
projects that “maxim[ize] net benefits for the people of the 
state” can move forward.110 
In Postema, the court considered OCPI, describing it as a 
“narrow exception,” and stated that “[w]ithdrawals of water 
which would conflict therewith shall be authorized only in 
those situations where it is clear that overriding 
considerations of the public interest will be served.”111 Courts 
have been eager to narrow this exception.112 A quick example 
demonstrates that the OCPI exemption is a valuable tool that 
allows Ecology to achieve the State’s water policy goals of 
maximizing net benefits through harmonizing competing 
needs. In the Walla Walla Basin, a recent project eliminated a 
push-up berm diversion in favor of a modern fish-friendly 
diversion, which required the use of OCPI.113 The project 
moved points of diversion upstream approximately one mile.114 
Although the project increased stream flow for a larger stretch 
of river than it impaired, and removed the last gravel push up 
berm (a major impediment to the migration of endangered fish 
107. E.g., Postema, 142 Wash. 2d at 97, 11 P.3d at 743 (internal quotations omitted). 
108. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.54.020(3) (2012). 
109. Id. § 90.54.010. 
110. Id. § 90.54.020(2). 
111. Postema, 142 Wash. 2d at 81, 11 P.3d at 735 (2000); Swinomish Indian Tribal 
Cmty. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 178 Wash. 2d 571, 311 P.3d 6, 8 (2013) (re-affirming 
Postema). 
112. See supra Part II. 
113. WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, SEPA MDNS BERGEVIN-WILLIAMS/OLD LOWDEN 
CONSOLIDATION PROJECT 3 (Apr. 6, 2012), on file with author. 
114. Id. 
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species) on the mainstream Walla Walla, Ecology determined 
that the water right change application process did not allow 
for consideration of net benefits outside of an OCPI analysis.115 
Thus, an OCPI process was utilized to allow these rights to be 
transferred. Restricting the use of OCPI to situations with 
solely public benefits, as suggested by the Washington 
Supreme Court in Swinomish, would prevent a project like this 
from occurring. 
C. RCW 90.42 Encourages Voluntary Transfers and Modifies 
Incentives to Claim Impairment 
The State Trust Water Rights Program (TWRP) was created 
to hold and protect water rights so water can be available for 
other uses.116 This can include either simply holding a right 
instream for environmental purposes or holding a right 
instream as mitigation.117 Trust Water Rights (TWRs) are not 
allowed to involuntarily impair existing water rights.118 The 
success of this program is in part due to its willingness to allow 
impairment of the TWRs in order to avoid challenges to the 
right. 
Consider the interim mitigation for a groundwater permit 
for the cities of Richland, Kennewick, Pasco, and West 
Richland (Quad-cities). Between 2003 and 2011, rights that 
had been previously used for seasonal irrigation were entered 
into the TWRP and used to mitigate for year-round impacts of 
the permit.119 This arrangement was required by a settlement 
agreement with a party that had challenged the permit.120 In 
2011, the Quad-Cities and Ecology entered into a 
115. Id. 
116. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.42.010 (2012); WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, 12-11-054: 
FOCUS ON TRUST WATER RIGHTS PROGRAM at 1 (2012), available at 
https://fortress.wa.gov/ecy/publications/publications/1211054.pdf. 
117. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.42.010 (2012). 
118. Id. § 90.42.010. 
119. Stipulation, Settlement Agreement and Order of Dismissal, Ctr. for Envtl. Law 
and Policy v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology et al., P.C.H.B. No. 02-216 (Pollution Control 
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Memorandum of Agreement, deciding to process a change to 
modify these rights back to seasonal mitigation.121 
The TWRP provided a solution that smoothed over the 
impairment analysis without covering Postema levels of 
impairment. During the interim period, a water right that had 
been used historically for seasonal irrigation on a tributary to 
the Columbia River was used to mitigate year-round municipal 
use.122 
D. RCW 90.90 Is a Political Solution to Water Re-Allocation 
on the Columbia River 
In 2006, The Washington State legislature created the 
Columbia River Water Management Program (CRWMP) to 
address pressing water right issues in the Columbia Basin.123 
The Act began with a finding that “[a] key priority of water 
resource management in the Columbia River basin is the 
development of new water supplies that includes storage and 
conservation in order to meet the economic and community 
development needs of people and the instream flow needs of 
fish.”124 The Act, codified in RCW 90.90, directs Ecology to 
“aggressively pursue the development of water supplies to 
benefit both instream and out-of-stream uses.”125 Under the 
CRWMP, Ecology is directed to provide new water supplies 
while providing a “one-third/two-thirds” allocation of new 
supplies between instream and out-of-stream uses.126 
In addition to having bonding authority,127 the CRWMP 
accomplishes its goals by relying on statutory provisions that 
streamline review of water rights for mitigation and 
consultation purposes.128 Special authority is also provided to 
enter into “voluntary regional agreements” that allow rights to 
121. MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT: SECURING NEW WATER SUPPLIES FOR THE CITY 
OF KENNEWICK, CITY OF PASCO, CITY OF RICHLAND, AND CITY OF WEST RICHLAND 
(2011), available at http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/wr/ 
cwp/images/pdf/QuadCityMOA.pdf. 
122. Id. 
123. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.90 (2012). 
124. Id. § 90.90.005. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. § 90.90.020. 
127. Id. § 90.90.010. 
128. Id. § 90.90.020. 
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be issued from the Columbia River main stem under a reduced 
impairment test that focuses on impacts to the Columbia River 
main stem during July and August.129 
The Lake Roosevelt Incremental Storage Release Program is 
an example of how this program operates.130 The project allows 
for 55,000 acre-feet of water for new water supplies for out-of-
stream uses targeted by the legislation in non-drought years 
(27,500 acre-feet to enhance streamflows).131 An additional 
50,000 acre-feet is also provided during drought years for 
interruptible water right holders (33,000 acre-feet for out of 
stream use and 17,000 acre-feet for instream use).132 Other 
impacts of the program are mitigated by total payments of six 
million dollars (adjusted annually for inflation) and other 
consideration to the Confederated Tribes of the Colville 
Reservation and the Spokane Tribe of Indians.133 
The CRWMP is a political solution to provide water for new 
uses. A “two-thirds/one-thirds” allocation of water combined 
with large cash payments is not a precise tool that protects 
against Postema level impairment. It is however an effective 
scheme that encourages out-of-kind mitigation and utilizes a 
preset in-kind mitigation of fifty percent; in lieu of requiring 
precise modeling of impacts and exacting mitigation over time 
and space. 
129. Id. § 90.90.030. 
130. See generally Lake Roosevelt Incremental Storage Releases, WASH. DEP’T OF 
ECOLOGY, http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/wr/cwp/cr_lkroos.html (last visited May 30, 
2013) (background information). 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT FOR LAKE ROOSEVELT BETWEEN 
THE CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE COLVILLE RESERVATION AND THE STATE OF 
WASHINGTON (2007), available at http://www.ecy.wa.gov/ 
programs/wr/cwp/images/pdf/colville_agmt.pdf ($3,750,000); WATER RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT FOR LAKE ROOSEVELT BETWEEN THE SPOKANE TRIBE OF 
INDIANS AND THE STATE OF WASHINGTON (2008), available at 
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/wr/cwp/images/pdf/spokane_agmnt.pdf ($2,250,000). 
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E. RCW 90.92 is a Legislatively-Created Exemption That 
Allows Changes To Water Rights With A Less-Restrictive 
Impairment Analysis 
The Walla Walla Basin is currently home to a pilot program 
that calls for local water management.134 The key aspect of the 
program with regard to impairment is the “local water plan” 
provision.135 This provision allows for the modification of water 
rights without having to undergo a traditional impairment 
analysis.136 Local Water Plans must leave a portion of their 
“baseline” (historic) water use in-stream in return for 
flexibility in the exercise of their water right.137 
This program gives substantial discretion to the local board 
to determine what baseline water use is and to create win-win 
solutions to changes in water use in a way similar to the 
CRWMP. An example of this program is the Gardena Farms 
Irrigation District No. 13 Local Water Plan.138 The Plan added 
a purpose of use (aquifer recharge), added additional points of 
diversion (downstream and wells in order to provide enhanced 
stream flows for endangered fish species), and allowed the 
water right holder to voluntarily bypass a portion of their 
water right in order to provide fish passage without fear of 
relinquishment.139 In doing so, the project went through an 
impairment analysis, administered through the pilot process, 
that looked at the net benefits of the project from multiple 
perspectives.140 This program is another clear example of a 
legislative attempt to facilitate voluntary transactions 
amongst water users by loosening the impairment standard. 
134. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.92 (2012). 
135. Id. § 90.92.080. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. GARDENA FARMS IRRIGATION DIST.#13 LOCAL WATER PLAN AGREEMENT (2011), 
Walla Walla Watershed Mgmt. P’ship, LWP 10-01. 
139. Id. at 4–5. 
140. Id. at 2–3. 
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IV. THE JUDICIAL FRAMEWORK IS CONTRADICTARY 
TO LEGISLATIVE POLICY AND FIRST PRINCIPLES 
OF WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
Washington’s judicially created impairment regime comes at 
great cost. It undermines the State’s policy objectives of 
maximizing the net benefit of water use, reduces transfers, and 
is implementable in theory only. The standard relies on false 
assumptions about the sanctity of impairment. A large number 
of programs circumvent the most restrictive elements of the 
framework, and under-enforcement due to limited data or 
funding limits the effectiveness in all situations.141 The result 
is that water rights are treated differently based on their 
adjudicatory status or their access to legislatively created 
exemptions like the CRWMP or the pilot program in the Walla 
Walla Basin. 
Functionally, Washington’s judicial impairment standard 
inhibits the maximization of net benefits by protecting the 
status quo. This section extrapolates from the examples in 
Part III and argues that the current judicial impairment 
standard is in conflict with the State’s water policy of 
maximizing net benefit of the State’s water resources. 
A. The Current Standard Protects the Status Quo; Not Senior 
Rights, Instream Flows, or the State’s Water Policy 
A standard that truly implemented the State’s water policy 
would balance protection of right holders from impairment, 
provide them with clarity as to what their rights were, and 
facilitate transfer or changes that maximized the net beneficial 
use of water.142 Unfortunately, the judicial framework derived 
from Postema prevents this by dictating that there is no such 
thing as a “de minimis” impact of a water right.143 The Court 
forcefully stated this as: “piecemeal impairment would not 
preserve flows necessary to protect fish, wildlife and other 
141. Whether this is due to short-term budgetary constraints, long-term legislative 
resistance to funding enforcement, or may be more attributable to the high cost of 
adjudication, stream-measurement, and administrative enforcement is beyond the 
scope of this Comment. 
142. See Bretsen & Hill, supra note 16. 
143. Postema v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 142 Wash. 2d 68, 89, 11 P.3d 726, 
739 (2000). 
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environmental resources. . ..[In fact] all senior rights in a 
stream could be impaired by incremental impacts.”144 
Absent mitigation, all water right actions have secondary 
impacts.145 An overemphasis on this discourages changes and 
transfers and fails to protect existing rights. Because the 
impairment framework is largely symbolic, it has little 
practical impact in meeting Washington’s current water 
demands or protecting existing uses. 
1. The Standard Discourages Changes or Transfers 
Changes or transfers can meet important water policy 
objectives.146 They can be used to address climate change.147 
They can be used to facilitate protection and restoration of 
instream flows.148 
Because impacts do not have to be direct and measurable 
the impairment analysis is quite burdensome. Professors 
Bretsen and Hill have recognized this in their article Water 
Markets As A Tragedy of the Anticommons; there they describe 
the anti-commons as a place where exclusion rights are 
separated from use rights.149 Economically, it is the opposite of 
the tragedy of the commons which creates an overutilization of 
a resource.150 The tragedy of the commons involves use rights, 
144. Id. 
145. Of course even the mitigation then has impacts. 
146. James L. Huffman, Markets, Regulation, and Environmental Protection, 55 
MONT. L. REV. 425, 434 (1994) (arguing that the environment will suffer if free market 
environmentalism based on common law systems is not allowed). 
147. Jonathan H. Adler, Water Rights, Markets, and Changing Ecological 
Conditions, 42 ENVTL. L. 93, 112 (2012) (arguing for use of water markets to address 
climate change is better than central planning). 
148. Janet C. Neuman, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: The First Ten Years of the 
Oregon Water Trust, 83 NEB. L. REV. 432, 433 (2004) (discussing the use of water 
markets to protect and restore instream flows in Oregon). 
149. See Bretsen & Hill, supra note 16, at 727 (contrasting to the tragedy of the 
commons which occurs when there are multiple use rights); see also Henry E. Smith, 
Governing Water: The Semicommons of Fluid Property Rights, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 445 
(2008) (discussing how “fugitive” nature of water makes efforts to modulize and 
quantify water rights using typical exclusion strategies difficult); Andrew P. Morriss, 
Real People, Real Resources, and Real Choices: The Case for Market Valuation of 
Water, 38 TEX. TECH L. REV. 973, 1008 (2006) (declaring that property rights must be 
“definable, defensible, and defeasible” in order to function). 
150. See Bretsen & Hill, supra note 16, at 727. 
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while the tragedy of the anti-commons involves exclusion or 
veto rights.151 
Professors Bretsen and Hill describe how exclusion rights, 
veto rights, and veto processes raise costs and decrease 
transactions.152 Specifically, they explain how statutory 
transfer requirements can discourage transfers.153 The 
Washington impairment standard imposes many of the 
downsides identified by Professors Bretsen and Hill.154 
The statutory transfer process creates exclusion rights in 
two ways. First, Ecology is prevented from approving a change 
or transfer if it would be detrimental to the public interest.155 
Determining what is in the public interest necessitates an 
administrative process that increases costs and is legally 
appealable.156 What the “public interest” is can be difficult to 
ascertain; in Swinomish the Washington Supreme Court split 
5-4 on whether exempt wells were by nature a public or a 
private use.157 Second, environmental groups can appeal 
changes, with the costs falling on the applicant.158 Because 
impairment has to be determined to a high level of precision, 
the statutory transfer process has high transaction costs 
derived from attorneys, expert witnesses, negotiations, 
hearings, appeals, and the opportunity cost of time these costs 
are borne by those who would like to transfer a right.159 This 
functions as a de facto tax on the transfer of water rights that 
has a chilling effect on transfers.160 While some of these costs 
are at least in part necessary an “expanded public interest 
standard. . .creates new exclusion rights separate from use 
151. Id. 
152. See Bretsen & Hill, supra note 16, at 730–56. 
153. See Bretsen & Hill, supra note 16, at 742–50. 
154. See supra Part II. 
155. TRANSFER POLICY, supra note 50, at 4. 
156. See Bretsen & Hill, supra note 16, at 727. 
157. See Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 178 Wash. 2d 
571, 311 P.3d 6, 13 (2013) (private), but see id. at 571, 311 P.3d at 22 (2013), (Wiggins, 
J., dissenting in part) (public). 
158. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21B.110(1)(d) (2012). 
159. See Bretsen & Hill, supra note 16, at 744-45 (describing statutory transaction 
costs). 
160. Id. 
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rights, thus leading to the tragedy of the anticommons in the 
transfer of rights.”161 
2. Rettkowski and the Adjudication Backlog Prevent the 
Standard From Protect Existing Rights 
Even if the disincentives to transfer were accepted as 
unavoidable, the standards do not even effectively protect 
existing rights from impairment. Currently there are eighty 
petitions on file requesting general adjudications and only one 
adjudication is active.162 Since Rettkowski v. Department of 
Ecology the only remedy for excluding rights that are 
impairing senior rights is a judicial adjudication.163 In 
Rettkowski, Ecology made a factual showing of impairment 
based on three decades of data164 and sought to regulate the 
junior rights through its regulatory power.165 Pursuant to 
Rettkowski, Ecology can only conduct “tentative 
determinations” when it is granting permits to new rights or 
authorizing changes and cannot regulate a non-adjudicated 
right.166 
This leaves water right holders without any practical 
options and highlights the absurdity raised by Judge Guy’s 
dissent in Rettkowski where he noted that if Ecology were to 
discover impairment of a senior right a week after issuing a 
permit they would be powerless to protect that senior right 
because to do so would constitute an adjudication.167 
161. Id. 
162. Of the eighty adjudications on file only discussions on the Spokane-area 
adjudication are moving forward, and they are subject to awaiting the completion of 
work on the Yakima adjudication because of funding. Frequently Asked Questions: 
Water rights adjudication will protect water rights in Spokane Area, WASH. DEP’T OF 
ECOLOGY, https://fortress.wa.gov/ecy/publications/publications/0911017.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 11, 2014); see also Water Right General Adjudications, WASH. DEP’T OF 
ECOLOGY, http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/wr/rights 
/adjhome.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2014) (background resources). 
163. Rettkowski v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 122 Wash. 2d 219, 238, 858 P.2d 232, 243 
(1993) (Guy, J. dissenting) (summarizing majority opinion). 
164. Id. at 221–22, 858 P.2d at 233–34. 
165. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21A.064 (2012). 
166. Rettkowski v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 122 Wash. 2d 219, 227–28, 858 P.2d 232, 
237 (1993) (en banc). 
167. Id. at 238, 858 P.2d at 242. 
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3. The Standard Over-enforces Symbolic Actions, Ignoring 
Internal Inconsistency 
Washington has recently taken a number of steps to restrict 
exempt wells, which use small quantities of water, but 
enforcement of existing rights vis-à-vis other existing rights 
remains infrequent because of procedural and technical 
difficulties.168 Exempt wells can be seen as a form of symbolic 
enforcement that placates certain interests while failing to 
address the more pressing matter of preventing impairment 
between existing rights.169 This symbolism can be compared by 
contrasting the absolute restriction on exempt wells that 
would individually have a small impact on instream flows (in 
many instances) with the difficulty of regulating an existing 
trust water right for instream flow. 
Consider a trust water right (TWR) that was transferred 
from an out-of-stream use. When the right needs protection the 
burden is on Ecology to demonstrate that it is appropriately 
curtailed.170 Imagine a TWR for one cfs with stream flows near 
that level. The right in question is downstream and can divert 
one cfs. Regulation would entail a number of steps. First, a 
measurement of flows at both points would be needed. 
Accuracy would be crucial and would be difficult at these 
levels. Ignoring the practical barrier, assume the 
measurements were 1.3 cfs at the point of TWR and 1.1 cfs at 
the point in question. How much of the 1.1 cfs is a result of the 
1.0 cfs TWR? Stream losses and gains should be factored in 
because only the TWR can be protected and Ecology has that 
burden.171 In light of Postema, the impairment would not even 
have to be measureable and would need to be calculated 
through time and space.172 In the end, Ecology could go to 
great effort but might not be able to prove that they were not 
168. See supra Part II.B. See also Jeremy Lieb, Comment, A Solution to the Exempt 
Well Problem? The New Role of Counties in Determining Legal Water Availability in 
Washington State, 3 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 60 (2013). 
169. See John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
233 (1990) (discussing how legislators enact “symbolic legislation” that sidesteps 
difficult policy choices in a politically expedient manner, and discussing the process by 
which administrative agencies resist such policies). 
170. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.42.040 (2012). 
171. Id. § 90.040(4)(a)(b). 
172. Postema v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 142 Wash. 2d 68, 11 P.3d 726 
(2000). 
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impairing other rights. The difficulty of proving a negative 
makes the regulation of an existing junior right difficult while 
the ease of prohibiting new rights allows for a symbolic gesture 
of protecting senior rights from impairment. 
4. The Standard Assumes the Existence of Data That May 
Not Exist 
A new water use authorization can only be issued if water is 
available.173 Intuitively, impairment involves calculating the 
future use patterns of all existing valid rights and subtracting 
that from the amount of water that will exist; the difference 
being water available for new permits. Unfortunately, the very 
nature of water, and its differences from land or personal 
property, makes this difficult to measure.174 
The most commonly used data, historical records of stream 
flows, groundwater levels, and water usage, are of varying 
availability and quality and make large assumptions.175 The 
largest assumptions are that the future will be like the past 
(i.e. factors like climate change, changes in irrigation practices, 
changes in crops, urbanization, or other variables will be non-
factors), that other withdrawals are legal, and that conditions 
placed on the authorization will be enforced.176 
Data accuracy issues are compounded by financial costs and 
legal difficulty in regulating to prevent impairment. In 
addition to the costs borne by the applicant, discussed in Part 
IV.A.1, supra, the conditions placed on the permit require 
enforcement. Even a simple limitation based on calendar days 
will not achieve 100 percent voluntary compliance. A more 
complex limitation based on streamflows or model outputs 
further increases cost and complexity. However, enforcement is 
173. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.290(1) (2012). 
174. Henry E. Smith, Governing Water: The Semicommons of Fluid Property Rights, 
50 ARIZ. L. REV. 445, 448 (2008). 
175. Gabriel Eckstein, Water Scarcity. Conflict, and Security in a Climate Change 
World Challenges and Opportunities for International Law and Policy, 27 WIS. INT’L 
L.J. 409, 414–31 (2009) (discussing hydrological and climatic changes). 
176. Id. (explaining impacts of climate change on water resources). 
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currently limited.177 Non-compliance with existing 
requirements is the norm.178 The result is that new water use 
authorizations must pass a very high level of review to prevent 
impairment, while existing right holders may never be held to 
the terms of their authorization. 
What is the end result? A passive status quo, not an active 
policy, of seeking to “maximize net benefits.”179 The 
effectiveness of the impairment framework is limited to 
symbolic enforcement over new rights, with limited capacity to 
enforce existing rights. As Justice Wiggins noted in his 
Swinomish dissent, “the fact that minimum flows constitute 
vested appropriations of water does not make them 
immutable.”180 Ascribing immutability to the impairment 
standard allows Washington courts to speak as the protectors 
of the sanctity of the water code, when in reality they are only 
solidifying the status quo with symbolic gestures. 
B. The Current Standard Creates a One-Way Ratchet 
Discouraging Voluntary Transactions 
A second argument against the current standard is that it 
creates a “one-way ratchet.”181 A downstream transfer will 
always be easier because of the required impairment 
analysis.182 Downstream transfers create an instream flow 
177. State Water Use Laws: Compliance and Enforcement, WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, 
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/wr/comp_enforce/comp_enfor.html (last visited Mar. 
11, 2014) (enforcement is focused on 16 fish critical basins and occurs only after 
attempts to induce voluntary compliance); see also Thomas Perkow, Columbia River 
Watermaster Duties and First Year Progress, WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, PRESENTATION 
TO THE COLUMBIA RIVER POLICY ADVISORY GROUP, May 6, 2009, available at 
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/ 
programs/WR/cwp/images/pdf/ppt_files/pag_5-09_wtrmstr.pdf (portraying limited 
geographic distribution of watermasters and describing initial efforts taken in 2009 to 
seek compliance on the Columbia River). 
178. Measuring Water Use, WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, 
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/wr/measuring/measuringhome.html (last visited Mar. 
11, 2014) (metering required by statute since 1993 and by court order since 1999 (for 
failing to comply with statute)). 
179. See WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.005 (2012); see also § 90.54.020(2). 
180. Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 178 Wash. 2d 571, 
311 P.3d 6, 22 (2013) (Wiggins, J, dissenting in part). 
181. Id. 
182. This is less true for upgradient transfers of groundwater rights, but can be 
similar when the transfer will have impacts on streamflows. See generally TRANSFER 
POLICY, supra note 50. 
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benefit between the old point of diversion and the new 
diversion. Conversely, upstream transfers have a negative 
effect causing impairment.183 This effectively prohibits 
upstream transfers where streamflows fall below those set by 
rule. 
The impacts of this one-way ratchet have two important 
implications: they can cause negative impacts to upstream 
communities and they complicate upstream transfers that 
have net environmental benefits. 
The downstream transfer of water to municipal use is also a 
concern for many rural Washington counties.184 The legislature 
became involved over concerns that the impacts to local 
communities from out-of-basin transfers are not being 
appropriately considered.185 Apart from the societal impacts, 
which are not the focus of this Comment, the technical impact 
of a transfer out of a subbasin forecloses future opportunities 
to use water in that subbasin. Ecology requires that “[t]he net 
effect on streamflows and instream values [of a 
change/transfer] must be neutral or positive. A reduction in 
streamflows during part of the year may be allowed if. . .the 
overall net effect on instream resources is positive.”186 
Upstream transfers in almost every scenario will fail this 
test.187 
An upstream transfer can also have environmental benefits. 
In Washington instream flows have been set in twenty-six of 
sixty-two basins,188 including fifteen of sixteen “fish-critical 
183. Id. 
184. Andrew P. Morriss, Real People, Real Resources, and Real Choices: The Case for 
Market Valuation of Water, 38 TEX. TECH L. REV. 973, 997 (2006) (stating that the 
externalities related to concerns about the impacts on agricultural communities of 
large scale water transfers to urban users are less than they initially appear). 
185. LAWRENCE J. MACDONNELL, PROTECTING LOCAL ECONOMIES: LEGISLATIVE 
OPTIONS TO PROTECT RURAL COMMUNITIES IN NORTHEAST WASHINGTON FROM 
DISPROPORTIONATE ECONOMIC, AGRICULTURAL, AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS WHEN 
UPSTREAM WATER RIGHTS ARE PURCHASED AND TRANSFERRED FOR USE, OR IDLED AND 
USED AS MITIGATION, IN A DOWNSTREAM WATERSHED OR COUNTY (2008) (legislative 
report on impacts of transfers on five northeastern Washington counties). 
186. TRANSFER POLICY, supra note 50, at 5. 
187. See supra Part III.B. 
188. Introduction to Instream Flows and Instream Flow Rules, WASH. DEP’T OF 
ECOLOGY, http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/wr/instream-flows/isf101.html (last visited 
Mar. 11, 2014) (explaining that an additional three basins have a federal flow rule and 
three currently have a proposed rule). 
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basins.”189 In these instances, an upstream transfer will 
necessitate an OCPI ruling whenever the transfer will involve 
a reach where the instream flows are not met.190 However, the 
result is patently undesirable. 
Consider a closed basin with set instream flows and one 
surface right in each of two subbasins. The rights are for one 
cfs and the stream flows are consistently one cfs lower than the 
minimum stream flows set by rule. If a right is transferred out 
of either subbasin it will be difficult to impossible to re-
establish use in that basin. Now, imagine a change request 
before Ecology to transfer the remaining diversion to the 
opposite basin. Further, imagine that the project creates a net 
benefit to the environment. Ecology cannot approve this 
transfer without resorting to OCPI because it will decrease 
instream flows in a closed basin.191 As demonstrated by the 
Walla Walla examples in Part III.B, there are circumstances 
when an upstream transfer is desirable. The legislative policy 
is clear—maximize the net benefits of water use.192 The 
current impairment standard inhibits that goal. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The current impairment standard that prohibits any 
impairment from new, or change, authorizations without 
consideration of a cost-benefit analysis conflicts with the 
State’s water policy of achieving maximization of net benefits. 
Perversely, this standard also limits Ecology’s ability to 
address impairment amongst existing rights.193 If the State is 
to achieve maximization of net benefits, their policies need to 
allow Ecology and water users to utilize market forces. 
The current standard was intended to guard against 
“piecemeal impairment,”194 and it does that effectively against 
the cumulative impacts of new rights. However, it creates 
problems for the effective protection of existing rights and 
189. WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, SIXTEEN CRITICAL BASINS, available at 
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/wr/instream-flows/Images/pdfs/16basinsmap.pdf. 
190. See supra Part III.B. 
191.  WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.380 (2012). 
192. Id. § 90.03.005. 
193. See supra Part IV.A. 
194. Postema v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 142 Wash. 2d 68, 89, 11 P.3d 726, 
739 (2000). 
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discourages voluntary changes and transfers. A more effective 
alternative would focus on maximization of net benefits, allow 
de minimis impacts, and consider how market incentives and 
decentralization could improve the management of water 
rights.195 
In Lessons from the Development of Western Water Law for 
Emerging Water Markets: Common Law vs. Central Planning, 
Professor Morriss identified the downsides of centralized 
planning schemes.196 He found two main advantages to a 
common law system: first, individuals were free to innovate, 
putting the burden on those who object to an innovation to 
show they were harmed by the change, and second, Coasian 
bargaining around common law decisions allowed parties to 
correct mistaken official decisions through private action.197 
The examples in Part III of this Comment identified these 
impediments. Efforts like the Columbia River Water 
Management Program and the Pilot Local Water Management 
Program in Walla Walla can be seen as attempts to 
decentralize water management while providing allowance to 
bargain and create solutions.198 The Trust Water Right 
Program also encourages transactions by obscuring 
impairment through facilitating mitigation and limiting 
regulation of trust water rights.199 These efforts modify the 
impairment analysis that makes a typical water use 
authorization difficult by structurally modifying it to limit 
analysis, allow out-of-kind mitigation, and encourage 
additional flexibility.200 
A restrictive interpretation of impairment protects nothing 
more than the status quo in a changing world. The current 
standard, while internally consistent with prior appropriation, 
is inconsistent with today’s demands and impedes the State’s 
interest in providing the maximum net benefits from its water 
resources. Changing demands and water availability demand 
flexibility. The strict impairment standard imposed by 
Postema, and the hostility towards Ecology discretion present 
195. See supra note 16 and corresponding text. 
196. See Morriss, supra note 16. 
197. Id. at 905. 
198. See supra Part III. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. 
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in Swinomish despite ambiguous statutory language, 
constrains market re-allocation of rights to achieve these goals. 
Despite these obstacles, Washington has created a number of 
successful and innovative efforts to facilitate voluntary 
transfers and mitigation within individual basins or areas of 
the State that demonstrate how the impairment standard 
could be relaxed state-wide.201 
Washington can better achieve its policy of encouraging 
voluntary transfers through judicial or legislative action to 
interpret impairment that: (1) allows for some de minimis 
impacts when justified under a balancing test overseen by 
Ecology and (2) simplifies the impairment analysis by 
encouraging and facilitating the availability and use of 
mitigation, both in-kind and out-of-kind, to mitigate 
impairment concerns. 
 
201. See supra Part III. 
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